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Originator usage control with business process
slicing
Ziyi Su,and Fre´de´rique Biennier
Abstract—Originator Control allows information providers to define the information re-dissemination condition. Combined with usage
control policy, fine-grained ’downstream usage control’ can be achieved, which specifies what attributes the downstream consumers
should have and how data is used. This paper discusses originator usage control, paying particular attention to enterprise-level dynamic
business federations. Rather than ’pre-defining’ the information re-dissemination paths, our business process slicing method ’capture’
the asset derivation pattern, allowing to maintain originators’ policies during the full lifecycle of assets in a collaborative context.
First, we propose Service Call Graph (SCG), based on extending the System Dependency Graph, to describe dependencies among
partners. When SCG (and corresponding ’service call tuple’ list) is built for a business process, it is analyzed to group partners into
sub-contexts, according to their dependency relations. Originator usage control can be achieved focusing on each sub-context, by
examining downstream consumers’ security profiles with upstream asset providers’ policies. Second, for analyzing SCG, we propose
two ’slicing’ strategies, namely ’asset-based’ and ’request-based’ slicing, to deal with the scenarios of both ’pre-processing’ a business
process scripts and ’on-the-fly’ analyzing service compositions. Last, our implementation work involves a ’context manager’ service for
processing business processes defined in WS-BPEL. It can be composed with our former proposed policy negotiation and aggregation
services to provide policy-based end-to-end security management. We also make experiments based on processing the sample
processes that come with ’WS-BPEL2.0’ specification.
Index Terms—Originator Control, Downstream Usage Control, Collaborative Business Process, Service Call Graph, Slicing, End-to-
end Security.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
In collaborative systems, participants share digital as-
sets, including computing capability (e.g. Web Service)
and information (e.g. data), in order to produce a fi-
nal artifacts (e.g. composed service, new information
generated from data aggregation). As assets are shared
beyond ownership boundary, risk of Intellectual Prop-
erty infringement (e.g. circumventing of trade secret,
or even leakage to a competitor) associated to ’loss of
governance’ is the major barrier for moving toward
collaborative business model [13] [11] [4]. There security
requirement is brought to an end-to-end scale: to ensure
the protection of corporate patrimony value during it full
lifecycle in the collaborative business process, covering
the creation, derivation and destruction stages, paying
particular attention on how the asset is used by part-
ners. Overcoming this barrier relies on a comprehensive
method that can make the ’pre-decision’ about selecting
partners based on historical comportment, as well as can
continuously regulate the partners behaviors on the fly
in the collaborative business process.
Such requirement leads to the pursuit of Originator
Control (ORCON) with Usage control policies [18] (or
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Downstream Usage control [2]), where the goal is to
require recipients to gain originator’s approval for re-
dissemination an originally digital asset or a new digital
asset that includes it [18]. Recent progresses in ’usage
control’ policies [16] [12] [30] pave the bedrock for fine-
grained control of ’due usage’ actions and ’obligations’
on digital assets. For now a stage, Originator Usage
Control policies are mainly built around the strategy of
close-coupling the control of assets dissemination paths
and the control of ’due usage’ in each hop [2] [18].
This strategy suit well scenarios where providers want
to have direct control on the exact dissemination steps.
But whan applied to more general business federation
scenarios, the close-coupling strategy can be cumbrous.
For now, collaborative business processes are achieved
mainly by ’on-the-fly’ service composition or pre-defined
orchestration (e.g. with WS-BPEL). In either case, the
originator’s end-to-end security requirements concern
choosing the partners that possess eligible ’Quality-of-
protections’ for its asset. Once the originators’ security
criteria are met, the decision of choosing which partners
(i.e. the exact paths of asset dissemination) is more
related to the business logic. Then, in the perspective
of security engineering for the collaborative context as a
whole, ensuring that all the providers’ security criteria
are maintained during the full lifecycle of their assets,
is the essence. This involves analyzing the collaborative
business process to track the dissemination paths of
every asset, the co-effect of their providers’ policies
calculated when assets merge, the consumer’s security
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profile (and ’usage’ activities) checked when an assets is
consumed.
In former works we have proposed a collaborative
usage control model that deduces the co-effect of poli-
cies [25] and an implementation architecture supporting
’usage control’ enforcement [27]. It’s our intention in this
paper to complete our end-to-end security management
framework, by developing a method for analyzing com-
plex collaborative context and applying collaborative
usage policy to manage asset sharing activities. The
basic thought is that security foundation for a successful
collaborative process is that each originator’s policy is
fulfilled during the whole business process.
For holistic view, we briefly introduce our analysis
of the asset derivation patterns and sub-context modes
involved in collaborative business processes. Security
management can be done in the scope of each ’sub-
context’.
The first contribution of this paper is a ’Service Call
Graph’ (SCG) we developed based on modifying and
extending System Dependency Graph (SDG), for repre-
senting partners’ interactions in collaborative business
processes. We also propose a data structure ’service call
tuple’ corresponding to the SCG for capturing ’depen-
dencies’ among partners.
Then We propose ’asset-based’ and ’request-based’
context slicing methods, for mining the ’asset (RoP)
aggregation’ and ’request (QoP) aggregation’ from the
’service call tuple’ list that represents a business pro-
cess. Such aggregations decides the partitions of sub-
contexts, where collaborative usage control policies can
be applied.
We analyze the sub-context developments, using ’pre-
processing’ and ’on-the-fly processing’ strategies, and
describe how originator usage control is achieved by
managing sub-context developments.
We also implement a ’context manager’ service for
the context slicing task, paying particular attention to
complex business process defined in WS-BPEL. This
service can be deployed with other components of our
’collaborative usage control policy’ enforcement system
[], to provide originator usage control service. Experi-
ment results of processing the sample business processes
that come with ’WS-BPEL2.0 specification’ are presented.
Section (2) introduces the ’usage control’ model we use
as foundation for ORCON, and the Service Dependency
Graph (SDG), based on which we develop a business
process ’slicing’ method. The difference between our
approach and several representative ORCON works are
discussed. Section (2.3) gives a general level description
of the assets aggregation patterns usually involved in a
business process. Section (3) introduces the business pro-
cess analysis method, led by a motivating use case. Sec-
tion (4) discusses the capability of our analysis method
with a more comprehensive use case. Implementation
and experiment results are introduced in section (5).
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Originator Control (ORCON) aims at enforcing
providers’ policies during the full lifecycle of assets
put to a collaborative context. Combining with ’usage
control’ policies enhance its expressivity w.r.t. defining
the ’consumption activities’ and the access condition.
2.1 Originator control (ORCON)
ORCON was brought forward to restrict the distribution
of documents in paper world [5], where the approval
of originator is always required. Traditional ORCON
solutions in cyberspace aim at automate ORCON [21]
[14], using some form of non-discretionary access control
list [18]. Recent works combine ORCON with usage
control, greatly enhanced its expressivity [18] [2]. But
these works center on allowing originators to control the
exact path their asset are re-distributed, therefore is more
related to the ’information dissemination’ control, which
are mostly encountered in security research of social net-
work or pub/sub systems. Whereas in enterprise level
federations, the assets dissemination path is more closely
related to the business logic. In other words, the origi-
nators’ security concern is that their assets must only
be passed to partners with eligible security attributes
(encrypted communication channel, secured platform,
organizational security management convention, etc.)
and allowed ’usage’ activities. As soon as these criteria is
met, the exact chosen partners and asset sharing ’paths’
are decided mainly according to ’common business goal’
(e.g. functional requirements and QoS requirement in
Web Service composition). Our work focuses on the en-
terprise level business federation scenarios and therefore
is different from the former originator usage control
works in that we identify the partners that the originator
will share assets with, allowing to exam their security
profiles with the originator’s requirements, based on
collaborative usage control policies.
2.2 Collaborative usage control policy
A basic usage control policy model can be described by
the following factors:
UCON = (S,O,Ct,Rt,Ob,Rn, P ) (1)
where
• ’S’ (Subject) is the party that can get a Right on the
asset. It is specified by a set of ’Subject Attributes’
(SAT ).
• ’O’ (Object) is the asset to be protected by the policy
rule. It is specified by a set of ’Object Attributes’
(OAT ).
• ’Ct’ (Context) is the collaboration context that is
associated to the status of the system infrastructure,
the environment and the business federation. It is
specified by the set of ’Context Attribute’(CNAT )
• ’Rt’ (Right) is the Operation upon the asset defined
by ’Sh’ that the Subject is allowed to achieve.
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• ’Ob’ (Obligation) is the obligation that must be
fulfilled by the Subject when it gets the Right.
• ’Rn’ (Restriction) is the attribute (from ’Context’ set)
associated to ’Rt’ or ’Ob’ to further confine in what
circumstance they are carried out.
• ’P ’ (Policy)is the usage control policy definition. It
maps predicates on a set of attributes identifying
’Subject’, ’Object’, ’Context’ to the predicates on a
set of attributes identifying ’Right’ or ’Obligation’.
Some works lay the foundation of ’usage control’
system. In the UCONABC model [30] [19] [29], access
decision is based on not only role (as in RBAC) or
identity (as in MAC and DAC), but on diverse attributes
of subjects and objects. With the grant and exertion
of a ’usage’ right, multiple consumption actions (e.g.
playing several songs) can happen, during this process,
the attributes of the object (e.g. the amount of the
’not used’ objects) and subject (e.g. balance in her/his
account) are constantly changing. The authors defined
models for ’attribute-update’ actions, which capture the
semantic of this process. A formalization dedicated to the
UCONABC model has been introduced [31] [32] using
Lamport’s Temporal Logic of Action (TLA). It describes
the temporal constrain between the action in Authoriza-
tion (granting of right), Obligation and attribute update
that results from the exercising of granted rights or
imposed obligations. Manuel Hilty et al. proposed a
usage control policy language [8] based on the analysis
of usage control requirements and existing control mech-
anisms [9] [20]. Their work gave a taxonomy on usage
actions, as well as the common attributes of subject, ob-
ject and environment, e.g. time, cardinality (’how many
times’ an action can be performed), events, purpose of
usage, etc.
In collaborative context, when assets merge, their
providers’ policies should also aggregate, to achieve
ORCON. One fundamental issue is to set the aggregation
method so that the resulting policy correctly interprets
the original goal of the providers’ policies. In our former
work [25], we built a collaborative usage control scheme
by introducing several factors:
• ’Sh’ (Stakeholder) is the owner of the rule, and is
the owner or co owner of the assets related to the
rule.
• ’lc’ (Lifecycle) defines the lifecycle [23] of a predi-
cate, extending the effect of the predicate to (indi-
rect) partners corelated by the business federation,
e.g. predicates tagged with lc = dp take effect
only between ’direct partner’, effects of predicates
tagged with lc = eot are maintained till the ’end of
transaction’.
• ’G’ (Aggregation algorithm) is the algorithm used to
’combine’ the individual policies from each ’Sake-
holder’.
Our policy scheme follows such design pattern that
providers use ’RoP ’ policies to express their ’require-
ments of protection’ upon their assets. Consumers use
QoP (analogous to the P3P [28] approach) to express
their ’Quality of Protection’, e.g. ’promises’ about the
protection they offer (they way they consume asset,
their security attributes, etc.). When two assets merge,
policies (the RoP s that are refined with ’lc’) upon them
are aggregated. For the partners who will consumer
the same set of assets, their QoP s are aggregated. The
aggregation algorithm detect potential conflicts between
the policies that will merge, in order to find inconsis-
tent security attributes (between QoP s) or requirements
(between RoP s).
In short, this policy use a strategy similar to the
’stick policy’ method [15] [3] [1], to allow propagating
providers policies to the artifact of collaborative context,
when their assets are merged into it. The advantage of
using scheme to manage collaborative context security
is that security configuration can be done in a peer-to-
peer manner: if every partners’ security requirements are
met, the condition (in security perspective) for context
to be set is fulfilled. But for this, partners’ assets sharing
relations should be identified. For a holistic view, next
section briefly introduces our former work on analysis
of the sub-context modes [26] incurred by asset sharing
activities.
2.3 Sub-context modes
Basically, only partners corelated by (both direct or in-
direct) assets exchanging a deemed in on sub-context.
For convenience of discussion, we denote the assets
provided by partners as ’Original Assets’ (’O-Assets’ for
short) and the artifacts of collaborative work (aggre-
gating several O-Assets) as ’Collaboration Assets’ (’C-
Assets’ for short).
Security management with the asset aggregation view-
point are based on the following principles:
1. All participants having the same ’Rights’ upon the
same C-Asset(s) are gathered in one sub-context.
2. Each sub-context has its Context Security Policy
(’CSP’ for short), which has two parts: RoPCSP
includes the providers’ RoP s and represents the
providers’ security requirements on the C-Asset;
QoPCSP includes the consumers’ QoP s and rep-
resents the the sub-context’s security profile for
future assets providers.
3. A participant can belong to more than one sub-
context at the same time. It must follow the CSPs
of all the sub-contexts it belongs to.
The central issue is to analyze the provider-consumer
relation among partners. Note that a participant in the
collaborative context can act as both provider and con-
sumer, according to the business logic, which make the
analysis tricky. We use a sample supply chain scenario
(see figure 1) to presents the sub-context modes one can
encounter when analyze a collaborative context.
We see 4 basic sub-context partition modes.
• ’Each Asset One Group (EAOG)’ mode:
When all providers can distinguish their own asset
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Fig. 1. Sub-contexts patterns in business federation
(O-Assets) in the artifact of business collaboration
(C-Asset), there is no asset aggregation, each part-
ners works in a separate sub-context. An example
(see ’EAOG’in 1) is when a down-stream provider
(D) receives inventory information ’Ia...In’ from up-
stream providers (UP) and concatenates them in one
XML file ’I’, each of them as a separate node. The
manufacturer (M) reading one nodes must follow
the due policy of UP.
• ’Single-Asset Single-Group (SASG)’ mode:
If the O-Assets in C-Asset are not identifiable,
their providers are deemed as in one single group,
given that they define the same rights. An example
(see ’SASG’in 1) is when production information
’C0a...C0n’ are merged by ’D’ to generate a global
scheduling ’C4’. ’M’ reads must fulfill the policies
of all the ’UPs’ in order to read C4.
• ’Single-Asset Multi-Group (SAMG)’ mode:
If the O-Assets in C-Asset are not identifiable, by
their providers have define multiple rights, each
right forms a group.
An example (see ’SAMG’in 1) is when the ’UPs’ all
define multiple rights (e.g. ’read’ and ’disseminate’).
Then their policies co-define multiple rights on C5
has multiple rights. Consumers holding different
Rights upon the same C5 are deemed as in different
sub-contexts.
• ’Multi-Asset Multi-Group (MAMG)’mode:
If there are multiple C-Assets and an O-Asset can
belong to more than one C-Asset at the same time.
We should identify which O-Assets disseminate in
which C-Assets, in order to examine, firstly, whether
the providers’ policies of aggregated assets are com-
patible and, secondly, whether the security profiles
of the consumers for a C-Asset fulfill the policies
(coming from the policies of O-Assets providers) on
that C-Asset.
These 4 patterns generally exist in many collabora-
tive contexts, as long as the issue of information asset
protection and consumption exists. Imagining changing
above supply chain scenario to others, e.g. switching
the materials providers as Cloud providers or Service
providers, the asset exchange pattern still fall in the 4
modes.
The CSP aggregation process involves detecting po-
tential conflicts, with a algorithm we proposed before
[25]
The center issue in this paper is to develop a method
that analyzes the collaborative business process to parti-
tion sub-contexts and allocate partners according to asset
sharing patterns. We develop a method for this task, bor-
rowing (and modifying) the method used for programm
slicing with System Dependency Graph (SDG).
2.4 System dependency graph
In business federation, assets transfer across organization
boundaries, possibly merging with other assets. In order
to give a life long protection to an asset, it’s necessary to
capture the asset derivation relations and track the asset
in the artifacts of business process. This issue is similar
in its nature to the ’Program Slicing’ [6] [33] task based
on System Dependency Graph (SDG) [6] [7]. Program
slicing asks about which statements influence (backward
slice), or is influenced by (forward slice), the current
statement under exam. Whereas collaborative process
analysis asks about which processes (functionalities pro-
vided by a partner can be seen as a process, e.g. imple-
mented with a Web Service) influence which processes,
therefore tracing asset exchange and derivations.
We use a similar approach to ’slice’ a collaborative
context into ’sub-contexts’. Each ’sub-context’ confine a
scope of partners interrelated by assets exchanges (in
other words, partners in different ’sub-context’ don’t
exchange asset, although they are in the same collab-
orative process). We firstly give an overview of the
’sub-context’ modes we may encounter when analyzing
a collaborative context, before introducing the analysis
method.
In the following sections, we fist discuss the analysis
of a collaborative context with SASG mode, guided by a
simple use case, in order to introduce the basic thoughts
underlaying out analysis method. Then we use a full-
fledged use case to describe how our method is used to
deal with complex business process that is in MAMG
mode.
3 CONTEXT ANALYSIS BASED ON ’CONTEXT
SLICING’
We use a simple use case (see figure 2) of Web Service
composition to facilitate our discussions.
x
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Fig. 2. Service composition represented with SCG
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Use case 1: An assurance association ’Deirect as-
sure’(D) consults ’medical information’ (m) from ’Bone-
tat clinique’(B). Part of the information, ’cardiac exam’
(e), is taken from a medical examination laboratory
’Cardis health’(C). The business process includes the
following steps:
(1) D contacts B, requiring m;
(2) B contacts C, requiring e, in order to reply D, if
success,
(3) C sends e to B;
(4) B merges e with m; if success,
(5) B answers to D.
As B and C are asset (information) providers in this
use case , ORCON means that their policies should be
respected during the whole lifecycle of their assets. This
involves answering two questions:
• (1) Which partners will access an asset? A question
of this type for ’use case 1’ is ”The ’Cardiac exam
info’ provided by C will be accessed by B or D, or
both of them?”
• (2) Which assets will be accessed a party? As a
simple illustration, in ’use case 1’ a question of this
type is ”Whether D will access the assets provided
by B and C, either directly or indirectly”.
While both of these questions can be answered intu-
itionally for ’use case 1’, the pondering procedure reflects
the goal and method of context slicing. Question (1) is
related to QoP aggregation among partners. Question
(2) is linked to RoP aggregation. The goal is to enable
the ’down-stream usage control’ [2], so that indirect
consumers should follow the policies of the O-Assets
involved in the C-Asset they access. The method we use
is analogous to the ’Program Slicing’ [6] [33] based on
System Dependency Graph (SDG) [6] [7].
3.1 Service call graph
A participant in a collaborative contexts is analogous
to a ’procedures’ in a SDG: receives calling information
and produce results. We use Pi
c
←− Pj to denote that
a party Pi depends on another party Pj with ’control
dependency’: whether Pi will be activated depends on
Pj . Pi
d
←− Pj denotes that a party Pi depends on
another party Pj with ’data dependency’: data provided
by Pj are involved in data produced by Pi. We propose
a data structure ’Service Call Graph’ (SCG) based on
extensions of SDG to represent partner interactions in the
collaboration context. These extensions can be illustrated
with ’use case 1’ (figure 2 is a SCG of ’use case 1’):
• The fist extension is that ’data dependency’ in our
SCG is differentiated as two types: an ’aggregation
dependency’ means Pi involves data of Pj (the same
as SDG), a ’non-aggregation dependency’ denoting
that data produced by Pi does not involve data
from Pj (an extension of SDG). For example, in the
SCG presented in figure (2), the blue edges (step
1 and 2) represent ’control dependency’. The green
edges (steps 3, 4 and 5) represent ’data dependency’,
where The solid green lines (edge 4 and 5) means
that the output data (response) includes information
from the input data (aggregation dependency). The
dashed green line (edge 3) means that the output
data does not include information from the input
data (non-aggregation dependency).
• The second extension is that the assets carried by
the message exchanges are attached directly to the
edges in SCG (see edges 3, 4 and 5 in figure 2).
• The last extension is that we represent failed inter-
actions (due to negative result of policy negotiation)
with dashed blue lines. A more comprehensive use
case presented in section 4 will give such examples.
In order to capture assets derivation pattern, we define
’indirect dependency’, based on partner service call in
a business collaboration: ∀Pi, Pj , Pk, ∀α ∈ {c, d} where
Pi, Pj and Pk are partners in a collaboration, c and d
are ’control dependency’ and ’data dependency’ rela-
tions respectively, Pi is ’indirectly dependent’ on Pk, if
’Pi
α
←− Pj ∧ Pj
α
←− Pk’.
There are two types of indirect dependency. ’Indirect
data dependency’ is the situation where each relation in
a dependency chain is ’data dependency’. We sum it up
as an axiom:
Axiom 1 (Indirect data dependency): ∀Pi, Pj , Pk: Pi
d
←−
Pj ∧ Pj
d
←− Pk ⇒ Pi
d
←− Pk
For example, in ’use case 1’, whether D gets the results
or not depends on the response of B. B’s response in turn
depends on response from C.
’Indirect control dependency’ is the situation where
’control dependency’ relation exists in the dependency
chain:
Axiom 2 (Indirect control dependency): ∀Pi, Pj , Pk, ∀α ∈
{c, d}: (Pi
c
←− Pj ∧ Pj
α
←− Pj) ∨ (Pi
α
←− Pj ∧ Pj
c
←−
Pj)⇒ Pi
c
←− Pk
As an example for indirect control dependency, in ’use
case 1’, whether C will be called depends on B. Whether
B will be called in turn depends on D. So C is indirectly
control dependent on D.
We can see the slight difference between axiom 1 and
axiom 2: Data dependency is transitive only when the
edges in the dependency chain are all associated to
’data dependency’, whereas when control dependency
exists in a dependency chain, it propagates ’control
dependency’ to the chain.
When analyzing complex business process, e.g. those
defined by WS-BPEL, one must consider the impact of
’variables’, which are used to carry information inside
the process. As information carried by ’variables’ are
eventually exchanged between partners, the information
exchanges between ’variables’ (e.g. through ’value as-
signment’) also lead to assets derivation.
These variables can be complex data type (e.g. defined
by XML schema). In this case, if a part of a variable is
valued-assigned to a part of another variable (see the
’sample process’ in WS-BPEL specification [17]), the later
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variable is ’data dependent’ on the former one. Thus we
have the following axiom:
Axiom 3 (Direct data dependency between variables):
∀cm ∈ Pi, cn ∈ Pj , cm
d
←− cn ⇒ Pi
d
←− Pj
where Pi and Pj stand for ’variables’. ’cm’ is part of Pi.
’cn’ is part of Pj .
There are only ’data dependency’ relations between
variables, as the only form of interactions between vari-
able is data exchange. Therefore the conditions leading
to ’indirect data dependency’ between variables can be
described by axiom 1. In the following discussion about
dependency relation, we don’t need to differentiate ’vari-
ables’ from ’partners’, as we can see that dependency re-
lations for ’partners’ and for ’variables’ can be described
by the same set of axioms.
3.2 Service call tuple
We use a tuple < Pi
t
←→ Pj ,∆ > to denote the service
call from Pi to Pj , ∆ being the exchanged asset. We can
have the following basic types of service call tuple:
• < Pi
c
−→ Pj > denotes that Pi calls Pj with a
message carrying no asset.
• < Pi
c
←− Pj > denotes that Pi receives a message
from Pj that carries no asset.
An example of these two types of service call is
when a mail agent queries a mail service for whether
a mail is sent, and receives confirmation from the
server. In such case the call message and the re-
sponse message are deemed as not carrying any
asset (i.e. information needing protection). We can
see that whether a message carries asset or not
depends on the straining criteria of security in a
specific application context.
• < Pi
d
−→ Pj ,∆i > denotes that Pi calls Pj , by
sending asset ∆i.
• < Pi
d
←− Pj ,∆o > denotes that Pi receives a
response from Pj that carries asset ∆o.
• < Pi
α
←→ Pj ,∆i,∆o > denotes that Pi calls Pj ,
sending asset ∆i and receiving response carrying
asset ∆o, where ∆o includes information from ∆i.
• < Pi
α
←→ Pj ,∆i,∆o, 6⊂> denotes that Pi calls Pj ,
sending asset ∆i and receiving response carrying
asset ∆o, where ∆o does not include information
from ∆i.
• < Pi
f
←→ Pj , 6⊂> denotes that the interaction be-
tween Pi and Pj failed, due to negative result of
policy negotiation.
These tuples represent the edges of SCG. We can
see that asset exchanges (and aggregations) occur with
service calls.
3.3 Assets aggregation
Usually, with partners’ interactions, assets derivations
(basically, either ’merging’ or ’splitting’) happen. There-
fore, recognizing assets derivation relations involves
firstly formalizing partner interactions with service call
tuples. Then the service call tuples list can be analyzed
to track the asset ’merging’ or ’splitting’ activities. There
are three situations that may incur such activities:
• If X sends information containing asset value to
Y , who aggregates it with its own information
(expressed as Y calling itself) and further send it
to Z . In this situation, we can identify the follow
service call tuple sequence:
< X
d
−→ Y,∆X >
< Y
d
←→ Y,∆X ,∆Y >
< Y
d
−→ Z,∆Y >
(2)
• If X sends information within its request to Y and
gets response(s) from Y that includes X ’s infor-
mation. This situation is represented by the follow
service call tuple:
< X
d
←→ Y,∆X ,∆Y > (3)
Extra attentions should be paid in this case, as we
can not be sure that the response message includes
information from the request message. Whether the
output (responses) from a partner integrates the
input (request) or not depends on the business logic
of this partner’s system. An example of this case
is when X sends some personal information to Y
to calculate the insurance premium. If the response
from Y consists in the insurance premium and the
person’s information, there is an assets derivation,
otherwise if Y answers with only the insurance pre-
mium, there is no assets derivation. Deciding what
information includes ’asset value’ and should be
protected is closely related to application domain. In
any case, we need to know relations between inputs
and outputs to conclude if assets derivation exists
during a direct interaction. This can be done by an-
alyzing partner’s service functional description, e.g.
WSDL in a Web Service context. It can also be done
at the business process level, by letting the service
composition service to adding extra indicators to a
WS-BPEL script. In the modeling level, we use the
following notations to define whether the partner
response includes information from request or not:
– Most of the time, request information (or part
of it) is included in the response, therefore we
use the default tuple to represent it:
< Y
d
←→ Y,∆i,∆o > (4)
– Whereas ’6⊂’ is used to indicate that no informa-
tion of the request is included in the response:
< Y
d
←→ Y,∆i,∆o, 6⊂> (5)
• If X ’fetches’ (expressed by ’stackrelc−→’, as there
is no asset value in the request) information from Y
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and aggregates its own information with it:
< X
c
−→ Y >
< X
d
←− Y,∆Y >
< X
d
←→ X,∆Y ,∆X >
(6)
As an example, we build the list of service call tuples
for ’use case 1’ (See formula 7, where the tuples in the
list are indexed by the steps of business process):
< τ1, D
c
−→ B >
< τ2, B
c
−→ C >
< τ3, B
d
←− C,′ E′ >
< τ4, B
d
←→ B,′ E′,′ME′ >
< τ5, D
d
←− B,′ME′ >
(7)
The assets derivation relations between partners are
equivalent to data dependency relations between them.
Therefore assets derivation trail, which decides the sub-
context pattern, can be mined from the list of service call
tuples.
3.4 Sub-context slicing
Like the information reachability questions in SDG, the
assets derivation trail can be tracked by scanning the
service call tuples list, paying particular attention to
asset aggregation. Based on this, providers’ policies upon
assets can be maintained during assets derivations. This
involves, firstly, allocating corelated assets in the same
sub-contexts.
We use a data structure ’context development tuple’
< NC , VC , PC , LA, LP , SC > to record the information of
sub-context development, where:
• NC is the name of the sub-context.
• VC is its version.
• PC the parent sub-context.
• LA a list of all the asset involved in the sub-context.
• LP the collection of policies in the sub context.
• SC the step of business process.
This tuple is built by the sub-context slicing process
which scans the SCG (e.g. service call tuple list) according
two strategies: ’asset-based slicing’ and ’request-based
slicing’.
Asset-based slicing focuses on capturing the aggre-
gation relation among assets. Using this method, a sub-
context is created when the first O-Asset is launched
into the collaborative context by the owner. When a new
partner join the context with a new O-Asset, the sub-
context consisting of the existing asset is updated, if
the new partner’s O-Asset is merged with the existing
C-Asset. Otherwise (i.e. the new partner’s O-Asset is
not merged with existing C-Asset), a new sub-context
is created. In ’use case 1’, the list of sub-context tuples
is as follows:
< RCB, 1, (φ), (e), (RoPC), τ3 >
< RCB, 2, (< RCB.1), (e,m), (RoPC , RoPB), τ4 >
< RCB, 3, (< RCB.2), (e,m), (RoPC , RoPB), τ5 >
(8)
We can see that in step 3 (represented by τ3), the first
sub-context is created, including the asset E and the
RoPC on it. We name the context after the interaction
leading to the creation of it, e.g. RCB (’resource’ sending
from C to B). Its version is ’1’. It has no parent context
(φ). Then in step 4, as new asset M merge with E, the
sub-context RCB.1 is updated to RCB.2. And in step 5,
it stays unchanged.
This list describes the evolution of the sub-contexts.
There is only one sub-context for ’use case 1’, which can
be represented with an assets derivation diagram (see
figure 3).
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Fig. 3. Assets derivation in the sample use case
Using the ’asset-based slicing’ method, policy nego-
tiation and aggregation (including conflicts detection)
can not be done until the first asset launched into the
context (’step 4’ of use case 1). If there is conflict, steps
τ2 and τ3 are actually wastes of partners’ resources and
don’t need to be proceeded. Therefore the ’asset-based
slicing’ method is better to be used for ’pre-processing’ a
business process script (e.g. WS-BPEL documents) before
the execution of it. To analyze a collaborative context ’on-
the-fly’, we need a ’request-based slicing’ method.
Request-based slicing creates a sub-context when the
first request is made. Then when a new partner joins
the business process, its QoP can either be aggregated
into existing sub-context, or lead to the creation of a
new sub-context. The decision is also straight forward:
the QoPs of two partners should be aggregated, if
they will access the same asset in future steps of the
collaboration context. With this method, we have the
following list of sub-context tuples for ’use case 1’:
< QDB, 1, (φ), (QoPD), τ1 >
< QDB, 2, (QDB.1), (QoPD, QoPB), τ2 >
(9)
This tuple list captures QoP aggregations. When the
first request is made by D in step 1, a sub-context is
created, including the QoP of D. We name the context
after the interaction leading to the creation of it, e.g.
QDB (’query’ sending from D to B). In step 2, as B is
requesting assets from C ’on behalf of’ D, QoPB and
QoPC are aggregated. Therefore sub-context QDB.1 is
updated to QDB.2
However, deciding who will access the same asset
is more tricky than it may firstly look like, especially
when partners work asynchronously, (e.g. between that
a partner ’X ’ receives request from partner ’Y ’ and
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responds Y , another partner ’Z’ sends request to X). We
provide basic protocols for dealing with such cases:
• Protocol 1: After X receiving request from Y , all
requests that X sends to other partners are deemed as on
behalf of Y , until X responds Y , or X receives a request
from another partner Z . This involves that a request
from Y to X establishes a ’on behalf of’ relation.
Consequently, the QoPY should be aggregated into
QoPX for all the requests X sends after receiving
request from Y , until X gets the result and responds
Y . The ’on behalf of’ relation between X and Y
ends when X responds Y . It also can, however, be
interrupted before X responding Y . The following
protocols regulate such cases.
• Protocol 2: An ’X on behalf of Y ’ relation is interrupted
by another ’X on behalf of Z’ relation if Z makes request
between X receiving request from Y and X responding
Y .
• Protocol 3: An ’X on behalf of Y ’ relation interrupted by
another request from Z can be resumed after X responds
Z , if X receives a response from a partner P , who was
called by X ’on behalf of Y ’. This means that the ’on
behalf of’ relation can be nested. For example, with
following request-response sequence (i.e. service call
tuple list in formula 10), we can say the ’on behalf
of’ relation between X and Y is restored after ’X
responds Z’ (step 5), by the interaction where ’P
respondsX ’, as ’P ’ is a partner that X has requested
on behalf of Y .
< τ1, Y
c
−→ X,∆i1 >
< τ2, X
c
−→ P,∆i2 >
< τ3, Z
c
−→ X,∆i3 >
< τ4, X
d
←→ Q,∆i4,∆o4 >
< τ5, Z
d
←− X,∆o3 >
< τ6, X
d
←− P,∆o2 >
< τ7, Y
d
←− X,∆o1 >
(10)
These are ’basic’ protocols because they handle the
most simple cases in service composition. When dealing
with real-world complex business federations, more in-
formation concerning the business process and partner
functionalities should be taken into consideration. But
the basic reasoning process remains in accordance with
those described in these protocols.
In the followings we discuss the employment of ’asset-
based’ and ’request-based’ methods for context slicing.
For this, we firstly give an overview of sub-context
developments that can occur in a collaborative business
process.
3.5 Context development
During each step (partner interaction) of the business
process, different types of sub-context development are
caused by the partners service calls:
• Create: The creation of a new sub-context is always
based on a independent QoP or RoP from a partner.
In other words, if the partner provides an asset
which is not aggregated with other assets in current
step, a new sub-context consisting of this asset and
the corresponding RoP is created. Analogously, if
the partner is calling others ’on its own behalf ’ (i.e.
not because it is doing so for responding another
’former’ requestor) a new sub-context consisting of
its QoP should be created.
• Update: On the contrary, updating an existing sub-
context happens if the partner’s asset has data
dependency (according to discussions in section
3.3) with the assets belonging to an existing sub-
context, or if this partners’ assets are merged with
existing assets. It also happens when the partner
is requesting assets on behalf of other ’former’
requestor, that is, it’s QoP and the QoP of the former
requestor should be ’transmitted’ to the requested
party. Therefore the QoPs are in the same sub-
context.
• Merge: Merging sub-contexts is a special kind of
update operation. It happens when two existing as-
sets in two sub-contexts merge, or when the request
sand by a partner is on behalf of several former
requestors from different sub-contexts. In the later
case, the different sub-contexts are corelated by the
asset value in the responding message.
• Split: While ’splitting’ a sub-context, several new
sub-contexts are created. They all ’inherit’ the assets
and policies of the previous context. Context split-
ting can be caused by three types of interactions:
– a party sends copies of the same asset to several
partners and the copies are developed differ-
ently;
– a party sends copies of the same request to
several partners at the same time;
– the business process has a control structure
defining parallel activities.
• End: Ending a sub-context occurs when it is merged,
split or when the whole business process ends.
3.6 Pre-processing and on-the-fly processing
In context slicing, pre-processing refers to the circum-
stances where a pre-defined business process (e.g. WS-
BPEL script) is analyzed before the execution, to see
whether it can be carried out, w.r.t. partners’ security
profile-request satisfiability. This can be done with the
’asset-based’ slicing method, given the policies and at-
tributes of partners.
In ’on-the-fly’ processing, partners’ RoPs and QoPs
must be aggregated as soon as they join the collaboration
context, in order to find out conflicts more timingly. This
requires using both ’asset-based slicing’ and ’request-
based slicing’.
For ’use case 1’, on-the-fly slicing strategy first builds
the QoP tuples (see formula 9) from the start of the busi-
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ness process, using ’request-based’ slicing. Then from
step ’τ3’, RoP tuples are built (see formula 8), using
’asset-based’ slicing.
The decided RoP aggregation relations and QoP ag-
gregation relations are used to generate the CSPs of each
sub-context. When a new partner joins the collaboration
context, it is allocated to a sub-context according to
whether it’s an asset provider or consumer (or both).
Then it’s policies are aggregated to the CSP of that sub-
context.
Next section gives a more featured illustration of the
context slicing method based on a full-fledged collabo-
rative context use case.
4 SLICING A COMPLEX CONTEXT
This section demonstrates the context slicing method
with a more comprehensive use case (see figure 4). First,
we briefly introduce the business process of this use
case. Then, the corresponding ’Service Call Graph’ and
’service call tuple list’ are described, before the ’on-the-
fly’ slicing process is discussed. Policies and CSPs of this
use case are omitted for simplicity (can be found in [22]).
Use case 2: This use case is a collaborative busi-
ness process for price inquiry. The tourism association
’Eighty days around the World’ (E) inquires ’Alice fan-
tasy tourism’ (A) for the total price and arrangement
of ’Cote d’Azur and the Mediterranean package tour’
for 50 persons. ’A’ inquires ’Beausoleil tourist office’ for
fete information. Then ’A’ produces the ’coach tour’ ar-
rangement information. It further inquires ’Cote d’Azur
airline’ (C) for travel arrangement (including air trans-
port and accommodation); ’David cruise line’ (D) for
cruise arrangement; ’Friend-arm’ (F) for assurance. ’C’
provides the arrangement of ’airline’ and inquires three
hotels ’Generous’ (G), ’Hospitable’ (H) and ’Ideal’(I) for
room arrangements.
4.1 Collaborative business process
The main business process (denoted as ’CBP’) comprises
9 steps and two sub-process (’SBPC’ and ’SBPT’), as
shown in figure 4.
The descriptions of the steps in CBP are as follows:
• step 1: ’E’ sends ’tourists info’ (o) to ’A’ to query for
’total price and arrangement’.
• step SBPC: ’A’ initiates a sub-process ’SBPC’ to to
inquiry the ’fete’ (f ) information.
• step 2: It’s composed of three concurrent sub-steps:
– step 2.1: ’A’ sends o and f to ’C’ to ask for
’travel’ information (v). It is followed (indirectly,
there is a sub-process ’SBPT’ between them) by
two sub-steps:
∗ SBPT ’C’ initiates a sub-process ’SBPT’ to
compose v.
∗ step 3.1: ’C’ sends v to ’A’.
– step 2.2: ’A’ sends o to ’D’ to query for ’cruise’
information (u). It is followed by a step:
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Fig. 4. Collaborative business process example: (a)CBP;
(b)SBPC; (c)SBPT.
∗ step 3.2: ’D’ sends u to ’A’.
– step 2.3: ’A’ provides ’coach tour’ information
(k).
• step 4: ’A’ combines v, u, k and o to ’arrangement’
information (r).
• step 5: ’A’ sends r to ’F’ to query for ’assurance’
information (n).
• step 6: ’F’ sends n to ’A’.
• step 7: ’A’ combines all the information to ’total
price and arrangement’ (t).
• step 8: ’A’ sends the t to ’E’.
• step 9: ’E’ processes t.
The steps in SBPC are:
• step i: ’A’ queries ’B’ for f .
• step ii: ’B’ sends f to ’A’.
The steps in SBPT are:
• step a: It consists in three concurrent steps initiated
by ’C’:
– step a.1: ’C’ sends o to ’G’ to ask for ’room’
information (m). It is followed by:
∗ step b.1: ’G’ sends mG information to ’C’.
– step a.2: policy negotiation shows that the
QoPH does not satisfy RoPE ; ’C’ ceases calling
the service of ’H’.
– step a.3: policy negotiation shows that the QoPE
does not satisfy RoPI ; ’I’ refuses to work with
’C’, because ’C’ is requesting ’on behalf of’ E.
• step c: ’C’ combines ’airline’ (l) information with
’mG’ to produce (v).
In the following sections, we build the Service Call Di-
agram (SCG) and discuss the sub-context slicing process.
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4.2 Service Call Graph
The service call diagram (figure 5) shows the partner
interaction during these steps.
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Fig. 5. SCG of the collaborative business process.
Meanings of elements are:
• Green lines represent data-exchange messages
which carries assets, where
– Solid green lines (1, i, 2.1, a.1 b.1, c, 3.1, 2.2, 3.2,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) represent the output messages that
have used information from the input messages.
– Dashed green lines (ii) represent the output mes-
sages that don’t include information from the in-
put.
• Solid Blue lines (a.2, b.2, a.3, b.3) represent control
messages which doesn’t carry assets.
• Dashed blue lines represent the interaction that failed,
due to negative result of policy negotiation.
• Each green line is attached with the asset it carries.
The list of service call tuple is as in formula (11):
<τ1, E
d
−→ A, (o) >
<τi + ii, A
d
←→ B, (o), (f), 6⊂>
<τ2.1, A
d
−→ C, (o) >
<τa.1 + b.1, C
d
←→ G, (o), (mG) >
<τa.2 + b.2, C
f
←→ H, 6⊂>
<τa.3 + b.3, C
f
←→ I, 6⊂>
<τc, C
d
←→ C, (mG, l), (v) >
<τ3.1, A
d
←− C, (v) >
<τ2.2 + 3.2, A
d
←→ D, (o), (u) >
<τ4, A
d
←→ A, (v, u, k), (r) >
<τ5 + 6, A
d
←→ F, (r), (n) >
<τ7, A
d
←→ A, (r, n), (t) >
<τ8, E
d
←− A, (t) >
<τ9, E
d
←→ E, (t) >
(11)
4.3 On-the-fly slicing
The business process starts with E’s request, which leads
to the creation of two sub-context. First, a QoP aggrega-
tion starts from the QoPE . Second, a RoP aggregation
starts from RoPE , as the request carries the ’tourist
information’ (o).
4.3.1 QoP aggregation
Firstly, we track the QoP aggregation process. By step 1,
QoPE leads to the creation of a sub-context:
< QEA, 1, (φ), (QoPE), τ1 > (12)
This sub-context splits as ’A’ calls ’B’, ’C’, ’D’ and ’F’
separately. Thus we have 4 parallel sub-contexts created
(see figure 6).
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Fig. 6. QoP aggregation. (a) E, A, B (b) E, A, C (c) E, A,
F (d) E, A, D
They are presented by the following sub-context de-
velopment tuples:
< QAB, 1, (QEA.1), (QoPE , QoPA), τi >
< QAC , 1, (QEA.1), (QoPE , QoPA), τ2.1 >
< QAD, 1, (QEA.1), (QoPE , QoPA), τ2.2 >
< QAF , 1, (QEA.1), (QoPE , QoPA), τ5 >
(13)
The sub-context QoPC .1 further splits into 3 three new
sub-contexts, as ’C’ calls ’G’, ’H’ and ’I’ for information
(see figure 7).
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Fig. 7. Details of QoP aggregation along ’E, A, C’
< QCG, 1, (QAC .1), (QoPE , QoPA, QoPC), τa.1 >
< QCH , 1, (QAC .1), (QoPE , QoPA, QoPC), τa.2 >
< QCI , 1, (QAC .1), (QoPE , QoPA, QoPC), τa.3 >
(14)
(IEEE FORMAT) 11
Set that QoPE doesn’t satisfy RoPH and RoPI , This
list of sub-context development tuples help us to find out
this right after ’H’ or ’I’ is called. Otherwise, if using only
RoP aggregation, we will find out that QoPE doesn’t
meet RoPI only at ’step 8’, when the artifacts consisting
asset from ’H’ or ’I’ are send to ’E’.
In short, the QoP aggregation ’transmits’ the up-
stream requesters’ QoPs along the business process, so
policies which do not match can be found in time.
However, QoP aggregation isn’t sufficient. As E’s request
carries o, any downstream partners receiving the request
should fulfill RoPE .
4.3.2 RoP aggregation
We start to track RoP aggregation process from step 1,
when ’E’ send its request carrying o:
< REA, 1, (φ), (o), (RoPE), τ1 > (15)
By ’step ii’, as B’s response f doesn’t contain o, there
is no asset aggregation between ’B’ and others in this
step. Therefore, a new sub-context is created.
< RBA, 1, (REA.1), (f), (RoPB), τii > (16)
However, these two sub-contexts should merge, as ’A’
aggregates f and o before step 2.1 and 2.2.
<REA, 2, (REA.1, RBA.1), (o, f), (RoPE , RoPB), τii >
(17)
This sub-contexts are succeeded by two different sub-
contexts, as ’A’ calls ’C’ and ’D’ in parallel.
• After ’A’ calling ’C’, ’C’ in turn calls ’G’ and get
mG. Then, ’C’ aggregate mG with l to get v. Thus
we have the sub-context tuples:
< RGC , 1,(REA.2), (mG),
(RoPE , RoPB, RoPG), τb.1 >
< RGC , 2,(RGC .1), (mG, l),
(RoPE , RoPB, RoPG, RoPC), τc >
(18)
• With ’A’ calling ’D’ and getting u, we have:
< RDA, 1,(REA.2), (u),
(RoPE , RoPB, RoPD), τ3.2 >
(19)
These two sub-contexts are merged when ’A’ merges
u, v and k into r.
<RDA, 2, (RGC .2, RDA.1), (u, v, k),
(RoPE , RoPB, RoPG, RoPC , RoPD, RoPA), τ4 >
(20)
Now ’A’ calls ’F’ with asset r and the aggregated RoP
of ’E’, ’B’, ’G’, ’C’, ’D’ and ’A’. Set that QoPF fulfills the
aggregated RoP, ’F’ will join the context, providing asset
n. Therefore the sub-context RDA.2 get updated.
< RDA, 3,(RDA.2), (n), (RoPE , RoPB, RoPG,
RoPC , RoPD, RoPA, RoPF ), τ6 >
(21)
Then ’A’ merges n with r into t.
< RDA, 4,(RDA.3), (n, r), (RoPE , RoPB, RoPG,
RoPC , RoPD, RoPA, RoPF ), τ7 >
(22)
In step 8 the aggregated RoP in sub-context RDA.4
(formula 22) is used to exam QoPE .
The on-the-fly strategy analyze the business process
to produce QoP and RoP aggregations. QoP aggregation
allows transmitting former requesters’ security attributes
down-stream, to match RoPs in time. RoP aggrega-
tion propagates former providers’ security requirements
down-stream, to ensure no leakage of the protected
information to unauthorized consumer.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 ’Context manager’ component
Implementation involves a ’context manager’ service
(see figure 8), which tracks the assets derivation to
decide policy aggregation relations and RoP-QoP ne-
gotiation relations among partners. Such information is
sent to the policy engine we developed in former work
[25], which includes a Policy Decision Point (standard
XACML PDP, as our policy model can be implemented
with XACML) for negotiation and a Policy Gathering
Point for policy aggregation.
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Fig. 8. Components of context manager
Our context manager cooperates with the business
engine to get the business process description encoded
with WS-BPEL, for ’pre-processing’ it before the ’or-
chestration engine’ starts business session. Major steps
during the processing are:
• step 1: The ’context analyzer’ loads a business pro-
cess defined with WS-BPEL and fetches the WSDL
files of the business partners defined in the WS-
BPEL.
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• step 2: It uses ’asset-based’ slicing method to pro-
ceed sub-contexts partition and allocates assets to
them, according to the assets merging/ inheriting
relations. The ’provenance indicator’ data records
the sub-context development information.
• step 3: For each ’sub context’, the ’policies assem-
bler’ fetches the RoP and QoP policies of all part-
ners, indicated by their WSDLs. It parses the QoPs
to complete the requests. Then it sends requests and
RoPs to the ’Negotiation and Aggregation’ engine
(’PDP’ for negotiation, ’PGP’ for aggregation.
• step 4: If the negotiation and aggregation results
for all the ’sub contexts’ are positive, the ’context
manager’ will call the ’orchestration engine’ to start
the business process.
The analyzing algorithm is organized depending on
the ’< activities >’ elements in WS-BPEL scripts, due
to their impacts on sub-context development. Basically,
they can be differentiated into 4 categories:
• category 1: The activities that lead to information
exchanges between partners, including < receive >,
< reply >, < invoke >, < assign > and < exit >.
This kind of activities can only result in the cre-
ate/update/merge/end of context.
• category 2: The ’control’ activities that lead to con-
text split, including: < sequence >; < flow >
with ’parallel = yes’ factor; < forEach > with
’parallel = yes’ factor; < if > with different
activities in its branches.
• category 3: The ’control’ activities that do not lead
to context split, including < pick >, < scope >, <
while > and < repeatUntil >. But their children
activities should be examined.
• category 4: The activities that are irrelevant to con-
text slicing, including < throw >, < wait >, <
empty >, < compensate >, < compensateScope >,
< rethrow >, < validate >, < extensionActivity >.
The context slicing process is carried out by two meth-
ods. Method ’coordinator’ (see algorithm 1) locates the
process starting point, i.e. a ’< receive >’, ’< pick >’ or
’< onEvent >’ activity that has a ’createInstance’ factor,
and creates the first context. Then it gets all the following
activities and sends them to the ’analyze’ method for
tracking asset aggregations.
Method ’analyze’ (see algorithm 2) deals with each
activity according to its impact on context development.
For activities of category 1, it calls a method ’develop’
with ’slicer = update’ For activities of category ’2’, it
splits (slicer = split) the context and examines the chil-
dren activities. For activities of category ’3’, it examines
the children activities.
The method ’develop’ updates the context list accord-
ing to the ’slicer’ factor. It creates a new ’context’ if
slicer =′ split′, updates the version of an existing context
if slicer =′ update′.
Algorithm 1 method ’coordinator’
Require:
The business process defined with WS-BPEL
Ensure:
An ’assembler’ Object, which comprises the context
slicing information
1: Locate the starting activity of business process;
2: Create the first ’asset’ object according to the starting
activity;
3: Create the first ’context’ object with the first ’asset’
object, the ’variable’ and ’step’ information;
4: Create the list of ’context’, which consists only the
current context;
5: Set the value of ’slicer’ to update;
6: for Each activity that follows starting activity do
7: Call method ’analyze’ with the activity, the ’slicer’
and the list of context;
8: Get the updated list of context;
9: end for
10: create ’assembler’ object with the list of context;
11: Enrich the context in the list with ’RoPs’ and ’QoPs’;
12: Output the configuration file with information in the
list of context;
5.2 Performance testing
This section analyzes the performance of the ’Context
Slicing’ component, based on experiment with the five
’Sample Processes’ taken from the WS-BPEL2.0 specifica-
tion [17] (’initial sample’ and other 4 samples in section
’15 Examples’).
5.2.1 Testing with ’TPTP’
Tables (1) and (2) show the TPTP profiling results of
’execution time’ analysis and ’memory consumption’
analysis separately. They are both based on running the
’initial sample’.
Package Base Time
(ms)
Average
Time (ms)
Cumulative
Time (ms)
Engine 1.93 1.93 100
I/O 76.31 38.15 76.31
Analyzer 21.13 0.17 98.07
Context 0.44 0.01 0.44
PartnerLink 0.09 0.01 0.09
Variable 0.10 0.01 0.10
TABLE 1
Time percentage of components’ execution
As shown in table (1), the I/O operation (the method
’getJdomDoc’) takes 76% of the total time. The analysis
process itself only takes 24% the total time. As the file
size of a BPEL document is usually very small, the I/O
time doesn’t change much with different BPEL files.
Therefore, we can conclude that the algorithm scales well
with complex (and long) BPEL processes.
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Algorithm 2 method ’analyze’
Require:
A list of the Indicator object, slicer and current
activity
Ensure:
An updated list of the Indicator object, slicer
1: if activity in ’category 1’ then
2: Call method ’develop’ with this activity, the
’context’ list and slicer;
3: else
4: if (activity in ’category 2’) then
5: for Each child activity do
6: Set slicer =′ split′;
7: Call method ’analyze’ with the activity, the
list of context and slicer;
8: end for
9: end if
10: else
11: if (activity in ’category 3’) then
12: for Each child activity do
13: Call method ’analyze’ with the activity, the
’context’ list and slicer;
14: end for
15: end if
16: end if
17: Output the context list;
Class
name
Live In-
stance
Active
Size (byte)
Total In-
stance
Total Size
(byte)
Analyzer 1 224 1 224
Context 16 896 16 896
PartnerLink 4 128 4 128
Variable 5 160 5 160
TABLE 2
Memory consumption of components’ execution
As shown in table (2), the memory consumption of the
context slicing method is insignificant. The total size of
memory consumption by all the instances is 1440 bytes.
Therefore, its impact is trivial when deployed with an
orchestration service.
5.2.2 Deployment testing
Figure (9) shows the performance testing results, in
terms of execution time for processing the 5 sample WS-
BPEL processes. The two environments are:
• ’Time1’: ’Intel T7250 (Dual Core 2.0 GHz)’ CPU and
’3.49G’ RAM.
• ’Time2’: ’Intel T2330 (Dual Core 1.6 GHz)’ CPU and
’2.00G’ RAM.
We can see from figure (9) that, first, although the
business processes are different in length and complexity
(see table 3 for comparison), the processing time for them
only varies slightly. Second, the performance changes on
different environments are evident.
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Fig. 9. Performance of deployment on different environ-
ments
Detail information of the 5 processes is shown in table
(3).
Meanings of column names are:
• The column ’partnerLink’ describes the number of
’partnerLink’ element in each BPEL file,
• ’variable’ the number of ’variable’ element,
• ’basic-activity’ the total number of activities that in-
cur partner interaction, i.e. ’receive’, ’invoke’, ’copy’
’reply’ and ’assign’.
Examples Time1
(ms)
Time2
(ms)
partn-
erLink
Varia-
bles
Basic
activity
Initial 156 250 4 5 10
Example1 140 218 1 3 9
Example2 156 242 5 7 18
Example3 140 211 3 3 5
Example4 156 234 3 6 14
TABLE 3
Detail information of the sample BPEL processes
We can see from table (3) that the ’Initial example’
and ’Example2’ are more complex BPEL processes. Cor-
respondingly, their processing time (shown in figure 9)
are longer.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Originator Control (ORCON) requires downstream con-
sumers to fulfill the originator’s requirements, therefore
providing full lifecycle protection for assets (i.e. service
and information) throughout the whole collaborative
context. It ensures that the assets transmission, consump-
tion and propagation are always in the scope defined
with providers policies.
Based on analyzing the characteristics of collaborative
business process, this paper describes a originator usage
control method fitting to inter-enterprise level business
federation. We propose a ’Service Call Graph (SCG)’ and
a corresponding data structure ’service call tuple’, based
on extending the System Dependency Graph (SDG), to
capture ’asset aggregation (and derivation)’ in a collab-
orative business process. A ’context slicing’ operation
can be made based on the ’SCG’, to categorize partners
that have direct and indirect assets exchange relations to
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the same ’sub-contexts’. Security policy negotiation and
aggregation done in the scope of each sub-context can
ensure originator control principle. A detail discussion
is given on the rational of our method, facilitated by two
sample use cases. Basically, ’data dependency’ between
partners incurs assets (and RoP policies) aggregation,
whereas ’control dependency’ between partners leads
to the ’on behalf of’ relation and QoP aggregation.
According to data dependency, ’asset-based’ slicing is
sufficient for ’pre-processing’ a business process script
(e,g. WS-BPEL script). But for ’on-the-fly processing’ a
business federation (e.g. dynamic service composition),
both ’request-based’ (due to control dependency) and
’asset-based’ slicing should be used. Implementation
works consolidate a ’context management’ service, pay-
ing particular attention to the analysis of BPEL-defined
business processes. Impacts on the analysis algorithms
from different types of ’activity’ defined in WS-BPEL 2.0
specification are discussed. Performance testing results,
based on the ’sample business processes’ that come with
the ’WS-BPEL 2.0’ specification, are presented. Future
work involves, firstly, the enrichment of context man-
ager functionality with ’on-the-fly’ analysis capability,
by managing dynamic service composition. This can
be done based on ’PEtALS ESB’ system, by extending
its service management functionality. Following work
includes the development of components for enforcing
originators usage control policies.
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